Passwordless SSO for Web & Mobile Apps
September 10, 2025 by Nick Moran

Passwords are the Internet’s oldest liability. They’re easy to phish, hard to manage, and expensive to support. Passwordless SSO (Single Sign-On) replaces fragile shared secrets with phishing-resistant cryptography, giving users one, seamless login across apps while reducing risk and cost.
This guide explains how to roll out passwordless SSO in modern enterprises. We’ll cover passkeys (FIDO2/WebAuthn), when to use SAML SSO vs OpenID Connect (OIDC), how to align with zero-trust login, and how to integrate with your existing IdP (Okta, Microsoft Entra ID/Azure AD, Ping, Auth0, Keycloak). We’ll finish with buyer checklists, pitfalls, and a practical migration plan.
Quick definitions
- Passkeys (FIDO2/WebAuthn): Cryptographic credentials that live on a user’s device (or in a secure, synced vault) and authenticate with biometrics or PIN. Passkeys are tied to the site/app origin and eliminate usernames and passwords. They’re phishing-resistant by design.
- WebAuthn: A W3C standard enabling websites to create and use passkeys via the browser; credentials are created and scoped per relying party (your domain/app).
- SAML 2.0: An XML-based federation standard widely used for enterprise web SSO (browser-centric, great for legacy apps).
- OpenID Connect (OIDC): An identity layer on top of OAuth 2.0, ideal for modern web, SPA, mobile, and API-driven architectures.
- Zero-Trust login: Don’t trust by network location; continuously verify user and device for each request. NIST SP 800-207 defines the principles and patterns.
Why passwordless SSO now?
- Stop phishing at the root. Government guidance recommends phishing-resistant MFA, not SMS or push codes. FIDO/WebAuthn passkeys are a core example.
- Align with zero-trust. Passwordless SSO pairs origin-bound credentials with continuous device/context checks, as outlined by NIST’s Zero Trust Architecture. [
- Enterprise momentum. Major identity platforms now provide first-class passkey support and enforcement policies (e.g., Microsoft Entra ID, Okta).
How passwordless SSO works (high-level flow)
- User opens the app (web, SPA, or native mobile).
- The app redirects to your IdP using SAML or OIDC (OIDC is preferred for mobile/SPA).
- The IdP performs passwordless authentication with passkeys (WebAuthn).
- The IdP issues a token (SAML assertion or OIDC ID token) back to the app.
- The app trusts the token and starts the user’s SSO session.
Because WebAuthn credentials are scoped to a relying party’s origin and use public-key cryptography, users authenticate without a password and phishable steps like SMS/OTP disappear.
Web vs. mobile: SAML SSO or OIDC for passwordless?
Short answer: Use OIDC wherever possible, especially for mobile and SPAs. Keep SAML for legacy browser apps.
- Mobile & native apps: IETF RFC 8252 recommends using the system browser with Authorization Code + PKCE, that’s the OIDC sweet spot. Embedded webviews are discouraged for security/usability.
- SPAs: Modern OIDC patterns (Authorization Code + PKCE) fit SPAs; SAML was designed for server-rendered browser SSO and doesn’t have a native profile for SPAs/mobile.
- Enterprise web apps: SAML remains ubiquitous and stable for classic browser SSO. You can still make it passwordless by using passkeys at the IdP and issuing a SAML assertion to the app.
Passwordless SSO comparison table
| Dimension | OIDC + Passkeys | SAML + Passkeys | 
|---|---|---|
| Best fit | Mobile, SPA, modern web/API | Legacy and classic browser apps | 
| AuthN mechanism | WebAuthn (passkeys) at IdP; tokens via OAuth/OIDC | WebAuthn (passkeys) at IdP; SAML assertions | 
| Mobile guidance | RFC 8252 (Auth Code + PKCE via system browser) | No native mobile profile; use via browser to IdP | 
| Phishing resistance | Strong (origin-bound passkeys) | Strong (origin-bound passkeys upstream) | 
| Dev experience | Modern SDKs, native app patterns | Mature enterprise integrations | 
| Future-proofing | High, fits zero-trust & API-first | Moderate, browser-centric | 
Sources:
Security model: why passkeys are different
Passkeys ≠ shared secrets. Each user/app pair has a unique key pair. The private key never leaves the device (or secure OS cloud), and the server verifies a challenge with the public key. Result:
Eliminates credential reuse across sites.
Prevents phishing (signatures are bound to the real origin, not a look-alike).
Reduces helpdesk load (no resets/rotations).
UX patterns that actually work
- Instant sign-in: Face ID/Touch ID/Windows Hello instead of typing. (That’s the passkey ceremony.)
- Cross-device sign-in: Scan a QR code to use a passkey stored on another device, great for desktop + phone, or iOS ↔ Android.
- Device-bound vs synced passkeys: Device-bound maximize hardware security; synced increase convenience. Choose per assurance level and app risk.
Architecture patterns for enterprise SSO and zero-trust login
- IdP-centric passkeys: Add WebAuthn at your IdP (Okta/Entra/Ping/Auth0), then keep existing SAML/OIDC trust to apps. This gives passwordless SSO everywhere without touching each app.
- Policy + device signals: Combine passkeys with device posture, network, and risk signals as NIST ZTA recommends (authenticate user and device).
- Web + mobile together: For mobile, follow RFC 8252 (system browser, Authorization Code + PKCE) via your IdP; for web, keep SAML and/or OIDC depending on the app.
IdP integration: you don’t have to rip and replace
- Microsoft Entra ID: Organization-wide enablement and enforcement (Authentication methods, Authentication strengths).
- Okta: Phishing-resistant authenticators (FIDO/WebAuthn, FastPass) and policies to enforce them.
- Ping Identity: WebAuthn/passkey SDKs and journeys for Android/iOS and OIDC flows.
- Auth0: Passkeys and WebAuthn MFA guidance and implementation patterns.
WWPass delivers passwordless SSO with no usernames and no passwords, compatible with your existing SAML/OIDC app catalog, so you can modernize authentication without breaking SSO.
Implementation guide: from pilot to production
- Pick your primary protocol per app type - Mobile/SPA/new services → OIDC (Auth Code + PKCE).
- Legacy browser apps → SAML (keep, but move auth to passkeys at the IdP).
 
- Turn on passkeys in your IdP - Enable FIDO2/WebAuthn authenticators and enforce phishing-resistant policy for high-risk apps.
 
- Design enrollment & recovery - Offer progressive enrollment (invite users to add a passkey after first login).
- Provide backup options (second device, hardware security key, admin-assisted recovery with strong proofing).
- Support cross-device sign-in (QR flow).
 
- Map assurance to passkey type - Device-bound for high assurance; synced for convenience; allow step-up for sensitive actions.
 
- Zero-trust policies - Evaluate device posture, geo, network, and risk at each auth and token refresh (per NIST ZTA).
 
- Developer patterns - Use standard OIDC SDKs; mobile follows RFC 8252 (no embedded webviews).
- For SAML apps, keep the SAML trust but make the IdP passwordless.
 
- Phase rollout - Start with IT & security staff → pilot departments → company-wide.
- Track fallback/exception rates and helpdesk metrics to measure ROI. (Operational best practice.)
 
Practical comparison: Password-based SSO vs Passwordless SSO
| Area | Password-based SSO (status quo) | Passwordless SSO (passkeys) | 
|---|---|---|
| Phishing | Vulnerable (password/OTP capture) | Resistant by design (origin-bound keys) | 
| UX | Typing + second factor | Tap/biometric | 
| Helpdesk | High reset/lockout volume | Lower resets/locks | 
| Compliance | Increasingly scrutinized MFA | Aligned with CISA/NIST guidance | 
| Forward-compatibility | Legacy bias | Mobile/SPA-ready (OIDC) | 
Guidance: CISA recommends phishing-resistant MFA; ZTA emphasizes continuous verification.
Buyer’s checklist: copy into your RFP
A. Authentication & security model
Confirm support for WebAuthn/FIDO2 passkeys; list platform and browser coverage.
Provide phishing-resistant MFA documentation and enforcement controls.
B. Protocols & app coverage
OIDC (Auth Code + PKCE) for mobile/SPA; SAML for legacy browser apps. Reference RFC 8252 compliance.
C. Device & recovery
Options for device-bound and synced passkeys; cross-device sign-in; backup keys; admin recovery with strong proofing.
D. Zero-trust integration
Ability to assess device posture and apply risk-based policies at login and token refresh (ZTA alignment).
E. IdP & app catalog
Native passkey support at your IdP (Okta/Entra/Ping/Auth0) and compatibility with SAML/OIDC app libraries.
F. Operations
Telemetry on failed/blocked attempts, enrollment rates, and self-service recovery outcomes. (Operational ask.)
Implementation pitfalls (and how to avoid them)
- Keeping passwords around “just in case.” 
 If users can still choose passwords, they will, and attackers will phish them. Enforce passkeys for high-risk apps and remove password paths over time.
- Using embedded webviews in mobile. 
 Violates RFC 8252; use the system browser with Authorization Code + PKCE.
- Assuming SAML is fine for SPAs/mobile. 
 SAML was never built for native/SPA patterns; prefer OIDC there.
- Under-investing in recovery. 
 Plan for lost devices. Offer backup security keys, additional device enrollments, and strong admin recovery procedures. (General best practice.)
- Skipping device and context checks. 
 Zero-trust means continuously verifying user and device, add device posture and risk-based access.
Frequently asked questions
Can we keep SAML and still go passwordless?
Yes. Add passkeys at the IdP and keep your SAML trusts; the IdP authenticates users passwordlessly and sends a SAML assertion to apps.
Do passkeys work on phones and desktops?
Yes. Passkeys are supported across major platforms/browsers and can enable cross-device sign-in (e.g., scan a QR to use a phone-stored passkey on desktop).
Are passkeys really phishing-resistant?
Yes. They use public-key cryptography bound to your application’s origin; there’s nothing to steal/replay. CISA endorses phishing-resistant MFA.
What about mobile SSO?
Follow RFC 8252: system browser + Authorization Code + PKCE via your IdP’s OIDC.
WWPass perspective (and why enterprises choose us)
WWPass delivers passwordless SSO with no usernames, no passwords, no OTPs, a single, strong login for all your SAML and OIDC apps. The WWPass Key experience consolidates identities while preserving your existing IdP and app catalog.
Step-by-step migration plan (90 days)
Phase 1, Prove it (Weeks 1–3)
- Turn on passkeys in your IdP for IT/security pilot groups.
- Enforce phishing-resistant policy on 3–5 internal apps. Track enrollment and helpdesk impact.
Phase 2, Expand (Weeks 4–8)
- Add customer-facing apps (OIDC). Keep SAML for legacy web.
- Introduce cross-device sign-in for common desk/phone mixes.
Phase 3, Standardize (Weeks 9–12)
- Make passkeys the default factor; restrict fallback to break-glass cases.
- Align access policies with NIST ZTA (user + device verification).
Exact language to request in contracts/security addenda
- “Provider supports WebAuthn/FIDO2 passkeys and offers controls to enforce phishing-resistant MFA for designated apps and user groups.”
- “Mobile flows comply with RFC 8252 (system browser + Authorization Code + PKCE); embedded webviews are disabled or blocked.”
- “Provider aligns with NIST SP 800-207 principles and supports device posture signals for zero-trust policy decisions.”
Bottom line
Passwordless SSO with passkeys (FIDO2/WebAuthn) brings phishing-resistant login to every app, OIDC for mobile/SPA and SAML for legacy web, while aligning with zero-trust. The result is stronger security, a smoother UX, and lower operational cost. Ready to modernize your enterprise SSO? WWPass can help you deploy no-password, no-username sign-in across your web and mobile portfolio, without re-platforming your apps.